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HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR ON MICROFILM

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15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns training material prepared by an unidentified agency ((possibly the NVN Lao Dong Party Central Headquarters)). The training material provides a general assessment of the development of the ((VC/NVA)) Revolution throughout Indochina.

(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 23 July 1971 in South Vietnam (YD573258; RVN MR 1) by the 101st US Abn Div (AM). The document was received at CDEC on 16 December 1971, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 46,901, dated 18 December 1971, under CDEC Document Log Number 12-1366-71. Translation was requested by JUSPAO, Vietnam.

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((Marginal Notes)):

((Possibly)) To Brothers Sau, Phong, Quang.

((This copy was sent)) to Sau.

Captured by US units at YD573258
on 23 Jul 71.

((Signed)): P

((Date)): 20 Nov 71

((End of marginal note)).

OUTLINE

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ((VC)) REVOLUTION THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA DURING THE RECENT DAYS.

I. SVN SITUATION:

1. A summary of the situation of the war against the US for national salvation (since the Spring of 1968).
2. Assessment on the significance of our struggle.
3. The capacity of our forces in the war against the US for national salvation.

1. Summary of the situation of the war against the US for national salvation:

((Seven lines were crossed out in original text)).

The general offensive in early Mậu Thân Lunar Year (in 1968) was a historic turning-point which has had a great significance. The enemy became confused, and the world was surprised at this event. As a result of this ((offensive)) campaign, the enemy was demoralized and weakened. He was incapable of regaining his strength. Our position and power on all battlefields became stronger. It was obvious that the US was defeated and it was only a matter of time before we gained the total victory. The heavy blows that we dealt to the enemy in the Mậu Thân Spring ((1968)) have undermined the US will of aggression.

Regarding the "unconditional" halt of the bombing against NVN and the acceptance of a four-side conference, the US stated there was a "secret agreement". But in reality, there was no "secret agreement". Only foolish men could believe this statement, because the cunning US imperialists never would accept such an important agreement ((sic)).

The acceptance of the four-side conference is obviously to recognize the NFLSVN and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of SVN.

Although France did not officially establish diplomatic relations with the NLF, it welcomed our delegation at the diplomatic level. Recently, the situation in Cambodia was unfavorable for the French. The French Foreign Minister came to visit Mrs Binh in an attempt to make a request for an arrangement.

The US was compelled to shift from the "search and destroy" strategy to the "clear and hold" strategy and the withdraw his troops ((from SVN)). The US had withdrawn 115,000 ((number not very legible)) troops. (It would withdraw 50,000 troops by Oct 70 to prepare for the congressional election, and 100,000 troops by Jun 71). The troop withdrawal was partial but very large, because 115,000 troops, equal to one-fifth, and 250,000, equal to a half of the total strength of the US expeditionary and satellite ((allied)) forces on SVN battlefields, would be withdrawn.

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The troop withdrawal caused the following difficulties to the US:

The anti-war movements among US troops increased.

The US could not increase its strength ((in SVN)) after withdrawing its troops.

The US troop withdrawal seriously demoralized the Puppet troops.

Why did the US ask for an "honorable failure"? It was because the US was a big imperialist country which never openly yielded to any country. So it could not be defeated in Vietnam.

Although defeated, the US did not want to end the neocolonialism of the imperialist clique.

In spite of its failure, the US troops pulled back and set up stable defensive systems with modern facilities in deep areas. At the same time, it increased police operations in cities. An example: It did not allow cargo trucks to enter the cities, conducted B52 raids in areas surrounding the cities, and cleared villages and hamlets. After the defensive systems were built, it launched limited counterattacks by applying the "clear and hold" strategy to implement the accelerated pacification and the Vietnamization plans (during the Johnson and Nixon administration).

Basically, these schemes were aimed at prolonging the war, and differed little from each other.

During the Vietnamization plan, the US would withdraw all its troops from SVN and would recognize a coalition government. It would maintain (air and artillery) support forces to provide support for the Puppet troops.

Thus, it hoped that Puppet forces could continue to fight for a long time.

The US imperialists were extremely stubborn beyond our imagination.

What are the present enemy schemes?

The following are some principal points of his schemes:

a. The enemy suffered heavy failures and was compelled to de-escalate the war. He de-escalated the war in an attempt to carry out his "Vietnamization" plan instead of ending the war.

While de-escalating the war, he intensified his counter offensives (which is a malicious strategic plan).

He attended the Paris Peace Conference but he wanted to gain advantageous conditions.

b. US schemes:

The US would withdraw its troops and the Puppet troops would replace them. The US would maintain its bases to supply support for the forces in SVN. This would probably be accepted by the American people.

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c. The enemy tried to prolong the war. When we tired, he sought to **attack** us to create a stronger position.

After the US troops withdrew from SVN, the enemy could still conduct a protracted struggle against us (struggle for peace).

However, the sinister US schemes had many contradictions.

The enemy had to de-escalate the war because of his weaknesses. However he intended to de-escalate the war ~~from a~~ strong position.

He was unable to gain victory when his ((US)) troops were committed ((to SVN)).

Because the Puppet troops were weak, US troops had to provide support for them. ~~Now while the US withdraws its troops~~ it **is attempting** to strengthen Puppet troops. (This is only a dream of the US government and a nightmare of the Puppet government, according to an Occidental newspaper).

The US wanted to minimize its casualties, but it withdrew its troops slowly.

It wanted to reduce war expenditures, but it involved itself in the war in Laos and Cambodia.

If the US troops were not withdrawn from SVN, the dissension in the internal organization would become more serious. But if the US troops were withdrawn, the Puppet troops would collapse.

If the US troops withdrew, their integrity would be weakened, and ours would be strengthened.

The puppet troops will have to undertake demanding missions after the US withdraws its troops. However, the capabilities of Puppet troops are limited.

If the US prolongs the SVN war it will be opposed by the American people.

The enemy conducted pacification activities to seize control of the people in villages, which created a deeper hatred of the enemy among the people.

No matter how skillful and talented ((President)) Nixon and his strategists and generals are, they cannot overcome these difficulties.

Despite the above facts, while de-escalating the war, the US succeeded in carrying out the following tasks to create difficulties for us:

- Consolidation of fortifications and defensive systems in the cities.
- Implementation of the pacification plan in some areas.
- Recruitment of additional Puppet troops (180,000 youths were recruited in 1969).
- In some areas of operation, US troops were replaced by Puppet troops.

The enemy was able to accomplish the above missions because we exposed too many vulnerabilities. In reality, he was not strong. We placed the emphasis on consolidating the front and disregarded the activities in the rear areas. Moreover our military proselyting activities were not promoted although the enemy units were disintegrated.

As compared to 1968, in 1969 we gained brilliant combat achievements.

The results of our activities against the enemy troops in 1968 and 1969.

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Year	Enemy KIA's			Enemy war facilities destroyed		
	Total	US & Satellite forces	Puppet Forces	Aircraft	Military vehicles	Logistical items (metric tons)
968	630,000 ((sic))	230,000	390,000	6,000	13,000	1,700,000
969	645,000 ((sic))	230,500	395,000	6,600	19,000	1,200,000 680,000 ((sic))

We killed more enemy troops in 1969 than in 1968 although the enemy only conducted small-scale attacks (regiment-size units and lower). (We sustained heavy casualties in 1968 due to enemy large-scale operations.)

We destroyed many enemy key command organizations and technical cadre. Although the enemy troops withdrew to their fortifications, we promptly changed our combat tactics and methods of operations. (Small, moderate and large-scale attacks were conducted properly, and our small forces were used to attack enemy large sized units).

In 1969, more helicopters were shot down.

From early 1968 to Jun 70, we killed, wounded or captured 1,505,000 enemy troops (including 535,000 US and Satellite troops).

We destroyed or wore down five brigades, 11 task forces or regiments, 275 battalions and 2,100 companies (one brigade was destroyed in 1968 and five brigades in 1969).

A total of 16,000 aircraft of various types were shot down (6,000 in 1968, 6,400 in 1969 and 4,200 in early 1970 ((sic))).

A total of 2,950 gun boats were sunk or set afire (including 1,000 in 1968 and 1,700 in 1969).

A total of 42,500 military vehicles were destroyed or damaged, including 23,000 tanks and armored vehicles (13,500 in 1968, 19,000 in 1969, and 10,000 in 1970).

A total of 5,100 artillery pieces or mortars and 2,100 ammunition depots and POL dumps were destroyed. During the first six months of 1970, 1,500 heavy weapons and 500 ammunition depots were destroyed.

We destroyed less logistical items in 1969 because the enemy dispersed them in different storage points.

Briefly, we have destroyed more enemy troops in 1969 than in 1968. However it does not mean that the enemy was defeated. We should make unremitting efforts to preserve our offensive position so as to impede the US from implementing the "Vietnamization plan". We should also make the enemy realize that if he remains stubborn, he will be destroyed.

In 1970, the activities on all battlefields were stepped up (especially in the Tri Thien Region and Region 6) although we encountered difficulties in 1969.

The counterpacification activities were performed properly (half of the strategic hamlets were destroyed). For example, the people in Phong ((Điện)) and Quang ((Điện)) Districts in Thừa Thiên Province were relocated back to their native villages. Phong Chương and Quang Thai ((Villages)) which had been under the enemy's control since 1967, were also liberated. In Phong An (Phu Ninh, Đông Đa) and Phong Sơn (Hiên Sĩ areas on the Highway # 1), the enemy was not capable of hampering our relocation of the people.

The enemy has withdrawn a large number of its troops from Gio Cam District in Quảng Trị Province. Many attacks were conducted, ((by VC/NVA)) in the lowland areas (Linh Chiểu and Bồng Hả areas, and Quang Trị City).

The enemy has exposed many gaps in the SVN battlefield since the US Puppet sent their troops to the Khmer Republic. The US troops have completely withdrawn from the western highlands. They also withdrew from the Mekong River Delta, and the Puppet troops did not replace them. The remaining Puppet troops needed support. We have recently launched attacks on Dalat, Phan Thiết and Cam Ranh (southern Trung Bộ); Dakson, Kontum and Pleiku (western highlands); Quê Sơn, Hiệp Đức and Tam Kỳ (Quang Nam Province); An Giang, Rạch Giá, Cà Mau (Western Nam Bộ); Mỹ Tho, Bến Tre, Trà Vinh (Eastern Nam Bộ); and Quang Lôi, Dầu Tiếng and Phước Vĩnh (Nam Bộ lowlands) etc... ((sic)). The Thiệu-Kỳ ((Government)) had boasted that the Puppet troops would not withdraw from the Khmer Republic, but it had to withdraw 16,000 troops from the Khmer Republic.

2. Comments on the significance of our victories:

Comparison of the war between friendly and US forces and other World Wars:

Wars	Population	Troop strength	Iron	Remarks
USSR against Fascist German	200,000,000 70,000,000	7,000,000 3,500,000	7,000,000 metric tons during 10 years	In that time, the allies of the of USSR were US, England, etc... ((sic)) they gained victory after fighting for four years.
China against Fascist Japan	450,000,000 80,000,000	1,500,000 1,000,000 (expedition- ary troops)		Thanks to the destruction of Japanese troops in Kwanton con- ducted by the USSR, China gained the victory after 11 years of fighting
Vietnam against US imperia- lists	34,000,000 200,000,000	525,000 expedition- ary troops	About a half of the world ((sic))	((North)) Korea had the support of 1,000,000 volunteer Chicom soldiers but we had no foreign support on the SVN battlefield.

1) We have not only defeated the US in Vietnam but also frustrated the global strategy of the US imperialists (see explanation in the remarks).

2) The world has five "thời điểm" ((possibly meaning turning points)) to evaluate the civilization of mankind. The struggle against the US imperialists by the Vietnamese people was one of them, because it paved the way for the liberation of mankind (see the remarks).

Remarks:

- 1) The US global strategy was divided into the three following categories:

The general force war (meaning nuclear world war).

The limited war: Nixon and his strategists were compelled to give it up because of their failures.

The unconventional war: Nixon wanted to maintain his doctrine of "local national soldiers with US firepower."

- 2) The five turning points of the civilization of mankind are as follows:

The ancient Greek civilization (or Greek-Roman civilization).

The Renaissance (the French revolution in 1789).

The October Revolution of USSR (November 1917).

The antifascist German-Japan war (1939-1945).

The struggle against the US for national salvation of the Vietnamese people.

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3. The possibilities of our present fighting against Americans:

The COSVN assessed that presently there are the two following possibilities:

Possibility of the war ending soon: (Because of the US heavy losses and our ((VC)) strong position, this possibility is greater than before. The enemy has recently devoted all efforts to play a final role in Laos and the Khmer Republic. Our successful activities may lead to this possibility. We should prepare to ~~maintain~~ this possibility by initiating the development of the Revolution.

The possibility of prolonging the war: The war will be prolonged if the US succeeds in carrying out its Vietnamization plan. However, the present protracted struggle is in the last phase.

A protracted struggle was initiated while the US was forced to de-escalate the war. (The climaxing phase of the war is over).

The two possibilities (ending and prolonging the war) depend upon our capabilities and efforts. At present, the enemy challenges us to endure a protracted war, so we should immediately prepare for a protracted struggle.

We should initiate a protracted struggle, however we **should try** to achieve a decisive victory as soon as possible.

While fighting against the enemy, we should strengthen our forces to pursue a protracted struggle. Furthermore, we should seize favorable opportunities to gain achievements in the war ((time)).

Remarks:

What is the possibility of the US resuming air raids against NVN?

This possibility no longer exists. Nixon is extremely stubborn and sometimes he becomes desperate. (Comrade Kosygin said: "Nixon does not have the minimum honesty of a capitalist.").

The US scheme is to destroy what it does not hold. For this reason, we should prevent enemy attacks against our critical areas.

II. SITUATION IN LAOS:

1. Strategic position of Laos.
2. US schemes and actions against Laos (1954-1969).
3. Collapse of the US imperialists in Laos.
4. Significance of achievements in Laos.

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1. Strategic position of Laos:

Laos is situated west of our country and has a border extending thousands of kilometers along ours. If the Laotian Revolution is successful, the border area from Muong De to Pleiku will be safeguarded.

Base areas of the three countries VN, Laos, and the Khmer Republic will be connected with each other.

The Laotian Revolution will expand its influence westward to Thailand and southward to the Khmer Republic.

2. US imperialists' cunning scheme toward Laos (1954-1969).

According to the 1954 Geneva Agreement, the two provinces, Sām Nua and Phong-Xa-Ly (controlled by the Laotian Resistance force) were to be placed under the Lao Kingdoms' control in 1956 and a coalition government was to be formed with Prince Souphanouvong as minister in charge of the ((national)) communication ministry. Two main force battalions of Pathet Lao were to be incorporated into the Royal Lao Army.

In 1957, the US made an attempt to undermine the implementation of the Geneva Accords. It placed Laos under the protection of the southeast Asia aggressive bloc and staged a coup d'etat (1957) to topple the Laos coalition government. It imprisoned Prince Souphanouvong and some Pathet Lao battalions. These units were forced to fight and leave Vientiane ((Capital)) for their former Resistance bases.

In 1958, Prince Souphanouvong escaped from the prison camp. A fierce civil war began. In 1962, after we gained successes from the Nam Tha Battle, the enemy was compelled to sign the Geneva Agreement on Laos for the second time. The Lao Kingdom Coalition Government was established consisting of three political cliques: The Pathet Lao, the neutralist and the rightist. ((Prince)) Phouma was Prime Minister (neutral); and Princes Souphanouvong and Phoumisavan (rightist) Ministers.

In 1963, the US imperialists also intended to stage a coup d'etat. They had:

Oppressed and bribed Phouma, inducing him to side with the rightist clique and give up the peaceful and neutral policy.

Activated Meo ((Montagnard)) Force (Special Forces) with approximately 20,000 men headed by General Vang Pao (under the leadership of the CIA) and used this force to harass the ((Pathet)) Lao liberated areas and ours and assassinate and kidnap cadre (Prince Souphanouvong's son was assassinated after he graduated from a course in the USSR and served as military cadre ((for the Pathet Lao))).

We participated in the Nam Tha Battle killing over 2,000 enemy troops and the Pa Khi and Tha Khet battles etc... ((sic)). Panic stricken and demoralized, Vang Pao's troops withdrew.

In 1969, the US secretly signed a military agreement with Thailand and Prince Phouma's Clique. It used Vang Pao's Forces (as main force) including 50 battalions commanded by US advisors and supported by the US Air Force to attack and occupy Canh Dong Chum ((Plain of Jars)) and Xieng Khoang Province (Aug 69), and attempted to consolidate Canh Dong Chum into a strategic area to expand the war in Laos. After attaining this area, the US boasted of the victory of the so-called "Nixon doctrine" that advocates the use of "local national troops and US firepower".

3. Collapse of the US imperialists in Laos.

In late 1969, in upper Laos, we fought for ten days and re-occupied Canh Dong Chum and Muong Khoang Xui area killing 5,000 enemy troops. The enemy left Xieng Khoang and moved to the Long Cheng area (note: The Long Cheng area had approximately 30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants who were aided by the US to transform it into a base area. We continued to encircle the enemy and attack the eastern area of Long Cheng, killing approximately one thousand enemy troops. Being seriously injured, General Vang Pao was evacuated to Thailand for medical treatment. The Vientiane Capital was oppressed).

In Apr 70, we attacked lower Laos, liberating the Attoneu Highland adjacent to the Khmer Republic and Vietnam. This is considered a very important strategic position.

In Central Laos, we seized Pha Lan ((sic)), and oppressed Savannakhet City.

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In upper, central and lower Laos, many reactionary pockets of resistance ((of Vang Pao's troops)) were destroyed. We set forth five solutions for a negotiation. Prince Phouma received the letter from Prince Souphanouvong at the time the US Puppet troops (in Saigon) intervened in the Khmer Republic crisis. He displayed a stubborn attitude, hoping that this intervention and the US oppression would create a favorable condition for him.

4. Significance of the Laotian's achievements.

a. The destruction of Vang Pao's Special Forces (main force) has frustrated the US imperialists' scheme of using local inhabitants to fight the local people (of the above twenty thousand reactionaries, over 13,000 persons were killed).

b. The US losses in Laos reflected its failure in the Vietnamization of the war in SVN (because the US wanted to test the use of Laotian Puppet fighters and US air support, then apply this tactic in the SVN war. This failure has strategic characteristic).

c. After being defeated in the war in Laos and in the limited war in SVN, the US will encounter difficulties if they attempt to turn the war in Laos into a limited war.

d. Due to these successes, the position and force of the Pathet Lao have been **greatly** increased and (the liberated areas in upper, central and lower Laos enlarged).

Assessment of the war in Laos.

It is very difficult for the US to create a limited war in Laos, because through experience, the SVN and Khmer Republic war has caused the US many difficulties and driven it into a state of dilemma. Consequently, the prospective of its complete failure has become clear.

III. THE SITUATION IN THE KHMER REPUBLIC.

In recent days, through the direct intervention of the CIA (US Central Intelligence Agency) Group, the US imperialists have incited their henchmen, **Lon Nol** and **Sirit Matak**, to stage a coup d'etat on 18 Mar 70 to overthrow the legal government of the Khmer Kingdom headed by **Norodom Sihanouk**.

1. Why did the US imperialists plan to stage a coup d'etat in the Khmer Republic (what are the US imperialists' schemes) ?
2. What was the evolution of the coup d'etat?
3. What are the **errors** of the US imperialists pertaining to their acts in the Khmer Republic ?
4. What is the progress of the revolution and war situation in the Khmer Republic?
5. What are the prospects of the Khmer Revolution?

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1. Why did the US imperialists stage a coup d'etat in the Khmer Republic?
(What are the US imperialists' plans and schemes?)

a. The Khmer Republic is an important strategic position. The US wants to occupy the Khmer Republic to set up an anticommunist defensive belt: SVN the Khmer Republic - Laos and Thailand.

However, in the face of Sihanouk's peace and neutrality policy, it (the US) has used **bribery** (stating that it would provide aid for the Khmer Republic to set up an irrigation system and exploit the Mekong River) and **threats** and has attempted to assassinate ((Sihanouk)). (It sent a gift containing a time bomb to Sihanouk. The bomb exploded, but Sihanouk survived while his **bodyguard** was killed).

The US still could not convince Prince Sihanouk ((to change his peace and neutrality policy)). Therefore, it was extremely discontent and considered the Khmer Republic as an obstacle.

Prince Sihanouk supported us but at the same time he caused us some difficulties. The US wanted to turn the Khmer Republic into a military base to exert pressure on us, attack us on the flanks and execute deep thrusts into our areas from behind in an attempt to attain a superiority to oppress the SVN Revolution.

b. Recently, the US has been defeated in the limited war in SVN. It has been forced to withdraw its troops but it carried out the Vietnamization plan.

However, the US feared that the Vietnamization plan would also fail and that was why it wanted to occupy the Khmer Republic in order to turn it into a foothold in the future. The US troops were afraid of being pursued by us ((VC/NVA troops)) while they were in the process of withdrawing.

In addition, the reactionary Khmers feared that the SVN Revolution would be successful and would affect the Khmer Revolutionary movement.

Recently, the Laotian Revolution has been developed. Due to the above mentioned reasons, the US instigated a coup d'etat in the Khmer Republic.

2. Development of the ((18 Mar 70)) coup d'etat in the Khmer Republic:

In the beginning, Lon Nol and Sirit Matak took advantage of Prince Sihanouk's absence to order ruffians to ransack the Democratic Republic of VN and the SVN Provisional Revolutionary Republic's Government embassy buildings. Then they sent us an ultimatum letter (demanding a withdrawal of our ((VC/NVA)) troops from the Khmer Republic within three days).

The French retained Prince Sihanouk in France and the US staged a coup d'etat in the Khmer Republic. They intended to inform Sihanouk of this occurrence afterwards and then advise him to return to the Khmer Republic (after having coerced him). When Prince Sihanouk expressed his desire to return to his country, the French intentionally delayed his trip to Moscow under the pretext that airplanes could not fly safely due to fog.

The US imperialist scheme was to use Lon Nol and ((Sirit)) Matak to overthrow Sihanouk but also keep him as a label like Phouma in Laos. However, Lon Nol and Matak, who were greedy for power, feared that if Sihanouk returned to the Khmer Republic, he would reassume power. Therefore, they disrupted the US imperialists' cunning schemes and announced that Sihanouk and his family were forbidden to return to the Khmer Republic.

As soon as Prince Sihanouk arrived at the Moscow airport, he was welcomed by ((Prime Minister)) Kosygin, who informed him that on the morning of the same day the US henchmen in his country had overthrown him.

Lon Nol and Matak, who instigated the coup d'etat, declared that the Monarchy was overthrown and a republican regime was established (this regime was similar to the Diem Nhu and Thieu-Ky Regimes). They also changed the foreign and domestic policies of the Khmer Republic. For example, they did not follow the peace and neutrality policy of Sihanouk. Instead, they supported the US. Therefore, they repressed the revolutionary movement in the Khmer Republic. They terrorized and massacred a large number of Vietnamese residents in the Khmer Republic and broke the diplomatic relations between the Khmer Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the SVN Provisional Revolutionary Republican Government.

3. Significant errors of the US imperialists:

a. The coup d'etat to overthrow Sihanouk was a great mistake by the US.

The US did not expect Sihanouk to side with the Communists so rapidly.

It failed to estimate the Khmer people's struggle spirit and strength, as well as

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the role of the Khmer people's patriotic forces, and Prince Sihanouk's prestige among the people.

It did not properly estimate the reactionaries of Lon Nol and Matak.

The coup d'etat took place on 18 Mar 70. When Sihanouk arrived in Peking from Moscow, he made very progressive statements which clearly indicated that he sided with the Revolution.

What is Sihanouk's personality?

Prince Sihanouk is of royal blood. As a king of the Khmer Republic, he is a nationalist and is anti-American.

He has sympathy for Vietnam (he knows that the Khmer people obtained independence because the French colonialists were defeated by the Vietnamese). Particularly, he admires Uncle HO.

He has foreseen the US imperialists' aggressive intentions.

If we defeat the US ((aggressors)), we would increase Sihanouk's confidence in our strength and capabilities and change his foreign and domestic policies.

Hence, Prince Sihanouk has supported the mission of fighting the US ((aggressors)) for the national salvation of our people. He has recognized the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the SVN Provisional Revolutionary Republican Government, accepted our diplomatic relations at the ambassador level, and has provided us with food provisions.

The US intended to stage a coup d'etat to coerce and force Prince Sihanouk to change his peace and neutrality policy. But it never expected Prince Sihanouk to side with the Revolution. The US imperialists are so mediocre that even a king opposes them. This fact once again proves that: "At the present time, persons who are truly nationalistic and patriotic will favor socialism." We are required to provide effective and clever leadership.

The US failed to estimate the Khmer people's struggle spirit and strength, and the role of the Khmer people's patriotic forces.

The Khmer people inherited an ancient civilization. They have traditions of heroic struggles against foreign aggressors to protect this civilization. During a half century under the French domination, the Khmer people along with the Vietnamese people opposed the French colonialists' yokes, and after nine years of anti-French resistance the Khmer people together with the Vietnamese and Laotian peoples gained the final victory. As a result, they have maintained their independence, peace, and neutrality for more than 15 years.

The US did not realize Prince Sihanouk's prestige among the Khmer people.

Prince Sihanouk was a nationalist and wanted to build his country according to his peace and neutrality policy.

For the past fifteen years Cambodia has been at peace and the peoples' living has improved. The Phnom Penh Capital was built, and a number of pagodas and water-power plants were constructed.

Therefore, Sihanouk won the confidence of people, especially the affection of Khmer monks and Buddhist followers (Buddhism is the national religion in the Khmer Republic).

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(Many Buddhist priests wept when Lon Nol and Matak assembled them to announce the overthrow of Sihanouk).

The US failed to estimate the Lon Nol and Matak Clique:

The US imperialists thought that by replacing feudalism with a republican government, the ((Khmer)) people would support Lon Nol and Matak's Government. They failed to realize that their henchmen were reckless, stupid, and tyrannical individuals. As evidence to this they have:

- Massacred those who protested against them.
- Barbarously massacred Vietnamese residents.
- Secretly assassinated many of Sihanouk's relatives in the royal palace (we know this although it has not been disclosed).

b. The US made a mistake when they sent their troops to the Khmer Republic.

In inciting its henchmen to wage a coup d'etat ((in the Khmer Republic)), the US made a mistake. Its mistakes can be explained as follows (only the military field is covered):

Due to the failure in the limited war in SVN, the US was forced to withdraw its troops ((from SVN)), 115,000 US soldiers, equivalent to one fifth of the US strength ((in SVN)). Its remaining strength is not adequate to hold its defensive positions.

Seriously defeated in the unconventional war in Laos, the US brought additional advisors and secretly sent US combat units, "the green beret troops", to Laos.

The US had to engage in another battlefield which was fairly important. The situation was not carefully studied and prepared by them. Dismayed and confused, it engaged in combat activities in the Khmer Republic in a critical situation.

This strategic error on the part of the US imperialists gave us an idea that the US was like a hare trapped in the Vietnam snare with one leg trapped in Laos and the other, in the Khmer Republic. In such a situation, the hare would soon die.

The history of the war proves that many generals have experienced failure because they have made the same mistakes. Example: During the aggressive war waged by the French colonialists against Indochina in 1952, when the lowland battlefield in NVN was endangered, De ((Lattre de)) Tassigny, a French General, adventurously brought his troops to our liberated area to occupy Hoa Binh City ((NVN)). This was a very passive act aimed at warding off our blow over the lowland battlefield of NVN. As a result, De Tassigny experienced bitter failures and was forced to withdraw his troops from Hoa Binh City.

c. But why did the US venturously intervene in the situation in the Khmer Republic:

The Khmer Revolution developed quickly and spread throughout all the provinces within forty days. In many areas, district and village revolutionary governments were established (over 50 districts or half of the number of districts in the country). Faced with the danger of a complete collapse, the Khmer reactionaries pleaded for help. In an attempt to send satellite troops to the Khmer Republic, the US convened an Asian conference to discuss the Khmer problem. However, this conference could not be held. In such a situation, Nixon decided to bring 70,000 US and Puppet ((RVNAF)) troops (from Saigon) to the Khmer Republic without consulting the US Congress.

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4. Progress of the revolution and war situation in the Khmer Republic.

a. First phase: From 18 Mar to 29 Apr 70.

On 18 Mar 70, when Sihanouk was ((visiting France)), the US CIA staged a coup d'etat and used the pro-American and reactionary Lon Nol-Matak Clique to seize the power. The results of the coup d'etat were not expected by the US, because the Khmer people everywhere strongly opposed it.

On 22 Mar 70, the Khmer people responded to the appeal of Sihanouk and conducted ((political)) struggles (meetings and demonstrations) in Prey Vieng, Ta Keo and Kompong Cham Provinces on 26, 27, 28, and 29 Mar 70. As of 31 Mar ((70)), the ((political)) movement developed in 17 of the 20 provinces.

In addition to political struggles, the military struggles were also promoted properly. Patriotic military forces were activated and quickly developed in various provinces such as: Ratanakiri, Mondul Kiri, Kandal, Takeo, Kampot, Siem Reap, and Battambang. (These provinces are located in the East, West, Central, South, and North ((of the Khmer Republic))).

The Phnom Penh Capital was under heavy ((military)) pressure, because the battles took place at 14 or 15 kilometers from Phnom Penh. Demonstrations were staged, and leaflets and grenades were thrown in the Phnom Penh Capital, etc ... ((sic)). Unable to cope with such a revolutionary "whirlwind", the Lon Nol-Matak Clique had to call for aid.

b. Second phase: (Since 30 Apr 70).

In order to save its henchmen for another sinister scheme on 28 Mar 70, the US ordered Saigon Puppet forces to conduct a search operation in the Khmer territory with one or two battalions. Examples: On 5 Apr 70, one Puppet battalion and one armored company from Long Thuan (Tay Ninh Province) crossed the Vietnam-Khmer Border and moved to the areas of Ta No, Ta Sach (Chot District, Soai Rieng Province). Five to six US/Puppet battalions were sent to the Khmer Republic on 17, 18, 20 and 23 Apr ((70)).

On 30 Apr 70, after deploying the US/Puppet forces ((President)) Nixon, in the name of the US Commander in Chief, directed US expeditionary troops in SVN and the Saigon Puppet Army to openly invade the Khmer Republic. He went to the Pentagon (US National Defense Department) to supervise the implementation of his plan of aggression (this act was contrary to the doctrine advocated by him).

Participating in this incursion were many "elite" US and Puppet units.

The US combat forces included the 25th Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and the 11th Armor Regiment.

The Puppet forces including the 5th, 9th, and 22nd ((Inf)) Divisions, and Marine and Airborne and Armor elements.

Their two main directions of attack were:

1. The "Parrot Beak" area in Soai Rieng Province.
2. The "Fish Hook" area between Prey Veng and Kompong Cham Provinces.

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The main front covered 400 kilometers (from the northeast to southeast) along the Khmer Republic border. The US and Puppet troops were divided into many spearheads making deep thrusts into the Khmer territory. There were eight spearheads (two primary and six supplementary ones).

1st Primary Spearhead: Three Puppet Task Forces composed of approximately 12,000 men began to attack the "Parrot Beak" area (Xoai Rieng) on 30 Apr ((70)) under the control of hundreds of US advisors and the support of artillery pieces, tanks and aircraft. In addition, three US battalions were brought close to the Khmer border to operate as a reserve force.

2nd Primary Spearhead: On 2 May, the US 1st Air Cavalry Division, the US 11th Armor Regiment, and elements of the 5th ((RVNAF)) Division, totalling approximately ten thousand men, conducted an attack against the Fish Hook area (Kong Pong Cham). In coordination with the first spearhead, it formed a two-pronged attack to encircle the VC Headquarters.

3rd Shearhead ((supplementary)): On 5 May, 6,000 troops from the 4th US Infantry Division and the 22nd ((RVNAF)) Infantry Division were brought from Pleiku to Ratakiri (in the Khmer Republic) by helicopters.

4th Spearhead: On 6 May, 4000 troops from the 25th US Infantry Division and a number of Puppet troops entered Prey Veng and Kompong Cham Provinces.

Four auxiliary spearheads launched a two-pronged attack against the northern "Fish Hook" area on 6 May. They also launched attacks on the western "Fish Hook" area and "Parrot Beak" area on 9 May.

On 9 May, the US and Puppet forces moved in three directions to the Phnom Penh Capital in an attempt to occupy it.

One element of the 9th RVNAF Regiment and 100 battleships of the US Navy Force moved up the Mekong River toward the Phnom Penh Capital. These units were supported by aircraft.

In addition, 30 helicopters landed Puppet soldiers in the Niet Luong ferry landing area (60 kilometers from Phnom Penh).

At the same time, thousands of Special Force soldiers, Vietnamese of Khmer Origin, who were trained and equipped by the Americans were airlifted to the Phnom Penh Capital to protect Lon Nol and ((Sirit)) Matak's final sanctuary.

c. Results:

With 70,000 troops (presently, almost 100,000 men) from the Navy, Army, and Air Forces, the US thought it could easily invade the Khmer Republic. However the US suffered bitter failures in all fields.

1. Military failure:

As published by the Americans, the major scheme of maneuver and operation was to annihilate the "VC General Headquarters." But their efforts were fruitless. European journalists joining the sweep operation reported that there were some abandoned houses. They ((VC)) might have left a long time ago.

Later (in a letter to NATC, according to UPI on 26 May), Nixon contradicted this, saying that the US did not plan to destroy enemy troops but their rear service installations. However, the BBC Radio Broadcasting Station ironically informed us of the following: "The US Headquarters declared that eight individual rudimentary weapons were found while the Puppet Headquarters stated that more than 3,000 shovel blades were seized. This was funny information."

All US and RVNAF attacking elements were continuously intercepted.

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As of 31 May 70 (one month after their incursion ((into Khmer))), some enemy attacking elements were pinned down and suffered heavy losses.

More than 6,000 enemy troops (2,000 US troops and 4,000 Puppet troops) were killed.

An estimated 320 armored vehicles were destroyed (most of them were tanks).

More than 10,000 various types of weapons and ammunition were captured.

Lon Nol-Matak puppet forces were quickly disorganized. (According to a BBC News Report on 6 May ((70)), within three weeks, beginning 18 Mar ((70)), the date of the Coup d'etat, ten ((Khmer)) battalions were destroyed or disorganized, and ten others were encircled and oppressed. More than 10,000 troops out of 60,000 were killed. By the end of May ((70)), 28 ((Khmer)) battalions were destroyed or disorganized (including 24,000 troops), and a large number of weapons and ammunition, and tanks were left behind. "Phnom Penh Capital might be seized" (according to a "BBC" News Report on 7 May ((70))).

2. Political and diplomatic failures:

In the United States, Nixon was opposed by the US Congress. The US Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate requested to speak to Nixon (this fact occurred for the first time in 51 years). Some departments also opposed him (including the Interior Department and the Department of Education, and "Fret Phot" ((possibly Clifford)), a former secretary of the US National Defense Department).

The US people, especially students and professors of universities, strongly opposed him. Nixon gave orders to oppress them.

As a result, ten students (including black and white youths of both sexes) were killed.

Allies of the US also opposed him or disagreed with him. Example: Being discontent, the French government permitted the French Communist Party to conduct a meeting of 250,000 people, and hold a conference for 18 Western Europe Communist Parties in Paris in order to protest the US incursion into the Khmer Republic and Vietnam. West Germany also opposed the US, whereas Japan dared not openly support it.

5. Prospect of the Khmer Revolution:

At present, the attacks conducted by the US imperialists against the Khmer Republic have caused us a number of temporary difficulties, however we have liberated the Attapeu Plateau (Lower Laos) which borders the Khmer base area (Strung Treng and Ra-Ta-Ki-Ri Provinces) and Pleiku Highland, transforming it into a common and large base area for the three countries in Indochina.

Regarding the general situation, the Khmer Revolution will have many advantages. It has attained remarkable achievements.

a. Military, political, and diplomatic achievements:

Military: As of the end of May ((70)), we killed and captured nearly 40,000 enemy soldiers (including more than 12,000 US/RVNAF soldiers), destroyed or disorganized two brigades, 56 battalions, and a number of command posts from sub-sector to military region level, seized more than 10,000 assorted weapons, destroyed nearly 1,000 military vehicles (half of them were tanks or armored vehicles), and shot down nearly 100 aircraft.

The ((Khmer)) people's armed forces have been rapidly developed. The guerrilla units have been quickly upgraded to main forces.

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The Khmer Liberation Army has not only been strengthened in its organization and members, but the combat capabilities and leadership have also been improved. It was capable of destroying ~~one~~ battalion-size units. We have provided support for it. Of course, only when the situation becomes favorable, can it successfully use our support to serve the revolutionary purposes.

The revolutionary movement has developed throughout various provinces (17 out of 20 provinces) within two months. The revolutionary machineries have been established in half of the districts and villages (3 province capitals, 53 districts, 11 towns, and hundreds of villages or hamlets were liberated). The Anti-American National United Front was established with the participation of the people from various social classes. Though the United Royal Khmer Government was just recently established (in a foreign country), it was recognized by nearly 20 countries. The three following Ministers were assigned the task of leading the in-country resistance.

Minister of National Defense: LT GEN Khiên Xem Phan ((Khiêu Somphon)).

Minister for Internal Affairs, Rural Reform and Cooperatives: Hu-y-un ((Hou Yun)).

Minister of Information and Propaganda: Hu N^um (Hu-Ni^um)).

This proves that the previous Khmer Regime was "passively neutral," and that the current one is "positively neutral" (socialistic).

b. Causes of victories:

The Khmer people have an ancient civilization, the Angkor ((Angkor)) Civilization (the Angkor Vat and Angkor Thom Pagodas, which were called Khmer ruins, one of the wonders of the world, were built and sculptured here over 1,000 years ago with an excellent technique).

They have a brave tradition of fighting aggressors, especially during the nine-year Resistance against French aggressors (the Khmer revolutionary forces led by Comrade Son Ngoc Nin in coordination with volunteer troops of the National Guard Brigades fought bravely). ((The Khmer revolutionary forces)) organized armed units, and prepared for an uprising under the leadership of the ((Communist)) Party (while the Lon Nol and Matak Clique made no war preparations. A country must make preparations for more than six months before getting involved in a war).

The Khmer Republic is situated adjacent to Vietnam, therefore the victories gained in countering the US ((aggressors)) by the Vietnamese ((Communists)) favorably influenced the fighting spirit of the Khmer people.

The US imperialists and their henchmen are invading the Khmer Republic.

The revolutionary situation of the Khmer people has become favorable. This means the opportunity to seize power is coming.

Briefly, the revolutionary situation in the Khmer Republic, and throughout Indochina, has become more favorable.

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IV. CONCLUSION:

The present revolutionary situation in Indochina is considered the most convenient opportunity that we have ever found in our history. It may pave the way for great achievements. Our Party and people are in a state of optimism. Looking back on our resistance against French colonists in Indochina, we realize that the French expeditionary troops were bogged down and had to thinly disperse their mobile forces in the Indochina battlefield when they were strongly attacked by our forces in upper, central, and lower Laos in 1953. The French colonists considered this a disaster. The US imperialists have also been in the same situation (comments on the military situation in Chien Binh Newspapers).

In 1970, Indochina became a common battlefield of Vietnamese, Khmer and Laotian people who were side-by-side in the united front to fight against the US imperialists and their henchmen. The revolution in Indochina will succeed soon and the two peoples ((Khmer and Vietnamese)) will advance to establish a socialist regime at the same time.

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